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Abstract
The Fed closely monitors the stock market and the stock market continuously forms
expectations about the Fed decisions. What does this imply for the relation between the fed
funds rate and the S&P500? We ﬁnd that the answer depends on the conditions prevailing
on the ﬁnancial market. During periods of high (low) volatility in asset price inﬂation an
unexpected 5% fall in the stock market index implies that the Fed cuts the interest rate
by 19 (6) basis points while an unanticipated policy tightening of 50 basis points causes
a 4:7% (2:3%) decline in the S&P500. The Fed reaction to asset price return is however
statistically diﬀerent from zero only in the high volatility regime, whereas the fall in asset
price return following an interest rate rise is highly signiﬁcant during normal times only.
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11 Introduction
The stock market boom of the late 1990s and its consequent bust has led to a resurgence of
interest on the conduct of monetary policy in the face of crucial developments in the ﬁnancial
market. In a recent speech at the Meetings of the American Economic Association, the Fed
Chairman Alan Greenspan (2004) oﬀers his own view on the subject. ”Rules that relate the
setting of the federal funds rate to the deviations of output and inﬂation from their respective
targets, in some conﬁgurations, do seem capture the broad contours of what we did over the
past decade and a half. And the prescriptions of formal rules can, in fact, serve as helpful
adjuncts to policy [...]. But at crucial points, like those in our recent policy history – the stock
market crash of 1987, the crises of 1997-98, and the events that followed September 2001 –
simple rules will be inadequate as either descriptions and prescriptions of policy. Moreover,
such rules suﬀer from ﬁxed-coeﬃcient diﬃculties”.
From a theoretical point of view, Bordo and Jeanne (2002) forcefully argue that the linkages
between asset prices, ﬁnancial instability and monetary policy are inherently nonlinear. Using
a model in which ﬁrms can only borrow against collateral and in which credit crunches occur if
asset prices fall below a certain threshold, they show that the optimal policy response to asset
price inﬂation is nonlinear, even though asset price stabilization is not a target of the Central
Bank. Moreover, a policy that (pre-emptively) raises the interest rate in the anticipation of
a credit crunch, dominates a purely reactive monetary policy that responds only to current
inﬂation and real activity. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), and Bernanke and Gertler
(1989 and 1999) provide a possible microfoundation for such a nonlinearity and show that the
magnitude of the eﬀects of asset price ﬂuctuations on the economy will strongly depend on the
state of household and ﬁrms’ balance sheets as measured by the degree and distribution of risk
exposure.1
Despite the growing number of theoretical contributions, the empirical evidence on the
nexus between monetary policy and asset prices is scant and to the best of our knowledge,
there are no studies that, on one side allow for nonlinearities in the Central Bank response to
asset price inﬂation and, on the other, explore the possibility that the stock market reaction
to monetary policy innovations is state-dependent. Moreover, these two channels are often
regarded as independent and there have been no attempts so far to build up a uniﬁed framework
for disentangling and measuring simultaneously the two eﬀects. This paper tries to ﬁll the gap.
We develop a new identiﬁcation strategy that explicitly incorporates the risks and condi-
1The idea is that agency problems make internal ﬁnance cheaper than external ﬁnance such that a raise in a
ﬁrm’s share price increases the available collaterals and reduces the marginal cost of external funds. Hence, ﬁrms
are more likely to increase their borrowing and investment in normal times rather than in periods of ﬁnancial
distress when collateral constraints start to bind. This mechanism is referred to as ﬁnancial accelerator.
2tions prevailing on the ﬁnancial market as emphasized by Bordo and Jeanne (2002), and Bean
(2003). In practice, we use daily observations to construct a within-month measure of volatility
in asset price returns. This is the threshold variable that governs the possible monetary regime
shift in a four-variate Structural VAR (SVAR) in interest rate, asset price returns, output gap
and inﬂation. The cut-oﬀ value is determined within the model: a change in stock market
volatility can be used to identify diﬀerent policy regimes.
Modelling monetary policy within an identiﬁed macroeconomic system - as opposed to
the single equation used in earlier contributions - has two advantages. First, it allows to
take explicitly into account the endogeneity problem due to the simultaneous relation between
stock prices and interest rate changes. Second, it provides a joint estimate of the response of
monetary policy to asset price and of the reaction of asset price to monetary policy. We check
and conﬁrm the robustness of our results using an alternative identiﬁcation scheme based on
a system of orthogonality conditions estimated with GMM.
A major ﬁnding of the paper is that US monetary policy over about the last twenty years
can be characterized by two regimes. Using monthly observations, the estimates of the reaction
function indicate that the periods of low ﬁnancial volatility are associated with a monetary
policy response to inﬂation and output gap only. In contrast, high volatility periods raise
the scope for a signiﬁcant interest rate reaction also to asset price inﬂation. As the regime in
which monetary policy actively responds to asset prices is associated with asset price busts, our
ﬁndings suggest that the policy of the Fed over the stock market can be described as reactive.
On the asset price side, the S&P500 index appears relatively more reactive to monetary policy
news in the high volatility regime, though the estimate of such a response is far less accurate
than its counterpart during normal times.
The paper is organized in ﬁve parts. Section 2 presents some narrative evidence and
the data, and shows that a number of key reduced-form statistics change quite dramatically
with the state of the ﬁnancial market. Section 3 describes a VAR model that can naturally
accommodate such a nonlinearity and presents the relative estimates. The following part uses
a system GMM and shows that the results are robust to an alternative identiﬁcation strategy.
The last section concludes.
2 Narrative evidence and descriptive statistics
Alan Greenspan (2004) identiﬁes four outstanding episodes in the recent US monetary policy
history. His speech will serve as a basis for our narrative evidence. All episodes are associated
with adverse outcomes on the ﬁnancial market and they include the stock market crash of late
1987, the ﬁrst Iraq war at the end of 1990, the liquidity crisis following the Russian default
3in 1998, the new-economy bubble of the late 1990s and its relative bust whose consequences
extend from early 2000 through late 2001.
Referring to the crash in October 1987, Greenspan (2004) observes ”We operated essentially
in a crisis mode, responding with an immediate and massive injection of liquidity to help
stabilize highly volatile ﬁnancial markets”. A similar reaction appears some years later when
”the weakening of demand already under way, some pullback of credit by lenders, and the spike
in oil prices after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait were suﬃcient to produce a marked contraction of
activity in the fall of 1990. [...] Policy eased gradually but persistently to counter the eﬀects of
these developments, with the funds rate falling to 3 percent by September 1992, its lowest level
since the early 1960’s.”.
The narrative evidence from the late 1990’s also appears to support the notion of a reactive
monetary policy stance. Moreover, there seems to be a case for a diﬀerent attitude of the Fed
towards stock market busts and stock market booms. On the one hand, ”the 1998 liquidity
crisis [...] prompted the type of massive ease that has been the historic mandate of a central
bank. Crises are precipitated by the eﬀorts of market participants to convert illiquid asset into
cash. [This] causes prices of equity assets to fall, in some cases dramatically.”. On the other
hand, Greenspan also argues that ”Nothing short of a sharp increase in short-term rates that
engenders a signiﬁcant economic retrenchment is suﬃcient to check a nascent bubble. The
notion that a well-timed incremental tightening could have been calibrated to prevent the late
1990s bubble is almost surely an illusion. Instead, we [...] need to focus on policies to mitigate
the fallout when it occurs and, hopefully, ease the transition to the next expansion.”
This informal evidence is suggestive and important because it identiﬁes a minimal set of
requirements for our framework: a credible empirical model of the interaction between the Fed
and the stock market must be able to track these episodes. Moreover, in his speech ”Risk and
Uncertainty in Monetary Policy”, Greenspan forcefully argues that during crucial events ”the
central bank pursues a risk management approach” according to which the costs and beneﬁts
of a policy action are weighted in the face of a pervasive uncertainty about the developments
in the ﬁnancial market.
We complement the narrative evidence above with some reduced form statistics that ap-
pears to corroborate the existence of important non-linearities in the joint behavior of monetary
policy and asset returns. The idea is that diﬀerent levels of volatility in ﬁnancial markets can
trigger oﬀ a diﬀerent policy reaction to movements in asset price returns. The justiﬁcation for
this comes from Greenspan’s speech. The stock market volatility can actually signal a situation
-or a prospect- of ﬁnancial distress such as to provide the policy makers with a simple, useful
measure of uncertainty and risk. In normal times, which we deﬁne as times characterized by
4low volatility, the Fed may not react to stock market returns. In contrast, episodes of high
volatility may require a signiﬁcant interest rate intervention.
The data set consists of ﬁve series. Among them, four are assumed endogenous and one is
assumed to govern the transition between regimes. The endogenous variables are stacked into
a vector yt and they are: the yearly inﬂation rate, ¼t, the output gap, xt, the Federal funds
rate, it and the growth rate of the S&P 500 Index, qt. The series qt is computed at each point
in time by ﬁrst taking the within-month average of daily observations on the S&P 500 Index
and then computing its growth rate. The threshold variable, zt, is the within-month standard
deviation of the daily growth rates of the S&P 500 Index.2 The sample is 1985:08 - 2003:10.
Four episodes of high volatility clearly emerge from Figure 1. Interestingly, they correspond
to the periods highlighted by Greenspan. The ﬁrst event is associated with the months between
the end of 1987 and the beginning of 1988 while the following period starts in the fall of 1990
and extends through early 1991. Financial markets become once more highly volatile between
the end of 1997 and 1998. The fourth and more prolonged period lasts from the end of 1990’s
to the ﬁrst two years of the new millennium.
In order to give a sense of the importance of regime changes in the identiﬁcation and
measurement of the response of the Fed to the stock markets, we report summary statistics
and correlations for the four series conditional on the high/low volatility level. We set the
threshold at z¤ = :0099. At this stage we do not oﬀer any justiﬁcation for this value. In the
following Section, we will rationalize it as the maximum likelihood estimate of the threshold
level in a multivariate TAR model.
Summary statistics and correlations for each regime are reported in Tables 1 and 2. The
stock market return, qt, displays a negative mean of around -0.9 in the high volatility regime
and a positive mean of about 1.8 in the low volatility regime. The reverse is true for the
output gap series where a positive mean of xt during high volatility periods turns negative
when volatility is low. The standard deviations of the ﬁve series in Panel B show a marked
diﬀerences across regimes in that they all peak during high volatility times.
Table 2 reports the correlation between the series over the full sample and over the two
sub-samples. The asymmetries are conﬁrmed. It is interesting to notice that high volatility
is associated with falling asset price returns while low volatility is associated with increasing
asset price return; the change in the correlation is remarkable and goes from 0:16 in the low
volatility regime to ¡0:45 in the high volatility regime. The federal funds rate displays a
positive correlation (0:10) with qt when the stock market is characterized by low volatility
while the correlation falls to zero when the volatility in stock market is high. The S&P 500
2Sources and deﬁnitions for the variables are detailed in the Appendix.
5return has a negative (¡0:17) correlation with inﬂation in the low volatility regime and a zero
correlation with inﬂation in the high volatility regime.
These descriptive statistics are of course only suggestive. Nevertheless, some important
asymmetries between the two Regimes seem to emerge and, more importantly, these asymme-
tries appear to characterize the interaction between monetary policy and the stock market.
Next section develops a nonlinear econometric model to formally account for these observations.
3 Evidence from a Nonlinear Structural Model
This section presents some empirical evidence on the nonlinear relation between monetary pol-
icy and asset prices. The estimates are based on a Threshold Structural Vector Autoregressive
(TSVAR) model.
3.1 The TSVAR Speciﬁcation
We assume the following structural form:
½
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where yt = (y1t;y2t;:::;ykt)0 is a k¡th dimensional vector time-series and Cov("i
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Di being a diagonal matrix and the matrices Ai having ones on the main diagonal. zt is the
threshold variable whose level determines the switching between regimes3. A more compact
representation is: ½
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Parameters in equation (3) can be estimated in two steps. For given r1, the two equations
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t denotes summing over observations in regime i, and ni denotes the number of obser-
vations in regime i.
In the second step, the threshold is estimated as the value ˆ r that minimizes the total sum
of squared residuals:
ˆ r = argmin
r1
S(r1) (6)
where S(r1) = S1(r1) + S2(r1) and Si(r1) is the trace of (ni ¡ k)ˆ Σi(r1):
The resulting estimates are thus: ˆ Φi(ˆ r) and ˆ Σi(ˆ r). Tsay (1998) provides the necessary
technical assumptions to guarantee the consistency of the above estimator as the sample size,
n, tends to inﬁnity.
3.2 Identiﬁcation
Having obtained estimates of the reduced form parameters, ˆ Φi(ˆ r) and ˆ Σi(ˆ r), we can attempt
to recover the parameters of the structural form.
By simply counting the number of free parameters in models (2) and (3), it is immediate
to see that in order to have a just-identiﬁed model,
k(k¡1)
2 restrictions must be imposed on (2)
in each regime.
3.3 The Reduced-form
We estimate a four variable TVAR with federal funds rate, stock returns, output gap and
inﬂation modelled as endogenous variables. In other words, yt = [it;qt;xt;¼t]. The threshold
variable, zt, represents a measure of asset price volatility and it governs the switch between
monetary policy regimes. Standard lag length criteria select a reduced-form system (3) of order
two. Moreover, two regimes seem to eﬀectively describe the monetary policy stance of the Fed
in the face of asset price volatility.4
The point estimate of the cut-oﬀ value for the threshold is 0:0099. Inspection of the path of
the threshold variable in Figure 1 reveals that the ﬁrst regime, which is represented by the thin
line, consists of 144 observations and it is associated with low values of volatility in asset price
return. Hence, we label it low-volatility regime. The second regime depicted by the thick and
dotted line is made up of 77 observations and virtually corresponds to the narrative evidence
on periods of ﬁnancial distress reported in section 2. We label this sub-sample high-volatility
regime.
4We also estimate a three-regime model and compare it to the performance of the two-regime model. The
data appears to favor the latter.
7The presence of two regimes in the parameters of the model is conﬁrmed by the rejection of
the linearity assumption. The likelihood ratio (LR) test for the null hypothesis of the validity
of the linear model, which is distributed as a Â2 with 46 degree of freedom, is equal to 142 and
strongly rejects the null. An alternative test derived by Davies (1987) to take into account the
presence of nuisance parameters, also rejects the null of linearity. Therefore, the presence of
two regimes in the parameter of the model seems to be conﬁrmed in the sample.
3.4 The Structural Form
Our goal is to recover the contemporaneous relations among the endogenous variables within
each regime. In particular, we are interested in the interest rate reaction to movements in asset
price return and in the response of the stock market to monetary policy news. To identify such
responses we assume that, on the one hand, the interest rate can respond contemporaneously
to inﬂation, output gap and asset return. On the other hand, inﬂation and the output gap
can respond to the interest rate with a lag of (at least) one period. These assumptions line up
with the identiﬁcation of a monetary policy shock proposed by Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (1999). In a similar vein, asset price returns are allowed to respond contemporaneously
to news about economic activity, though the reaction of output to movements in the stock
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The response of monetary policy to movements in the stock market is computed as the
cumulative changes in the interest rate following an innovation to asset price returns. The
cumulative response is given by the sum of a12 and the coeﬃcients on lagged asset price returns
in the interest rate equation. The reaction of the stock market to monetary policy is measured
on impact and it is captured by the parameter a21. The distribution of the parameters can be
calculated by montecarlo simulations, drawing residuals from the asymptotic distribution of the
estimated covariance matrices in each regime. Given the threshold value, we then re-estimate
the model and solve for the estimated coeﬃcient over 10000 draws.
Table 3 presents the structural estimates of some key parameters. As far as the monetary
policy reaction function is concerned, the low volatility regime in the second column is associ-
ated with a signiﬁcant response to contemporaneous inﬂation and output gap. The cumulative
response of interest rate to asset price return is however not statistically diﬀerent from zero,
thereby implying that a conventional Taylor rule in inﬂation and output gap does provide a
8reasonably good description of the Fed monetary policy during normal times.5 On the ﬁnancial
market side, this regime is characterized by a highly signiﬁcant response of the S&P500 Index
to the federal funds rate. In particular, an unanticipated monetary policy tightening of 50
basis points leads on average to a contemporaneous decline in the stock returns of about 2:3%.
The distributions of the parameters governing the relation between monetary policy and asset
price inﬂation in the low volatility regime are displayed in the ﬁrst row of Figure 3. The zero is
outside any signiﬁcant region of the parameter space only in the second column, which refers
to the asset price response to monetary policy.
The third column of Table 3 reports the estimates for the regime associated with a high
within-month volatility of the S&P500 Index. The response of monetary policy to inﬂation takes
a negative value which is statistically diﬀerent from the estimate of the low volatility regime
whereas the response to the output gap does not vary signiﬁcantly. The crucial diﬀerence is
however that the interest rate reaction to an unanticipated asset price shock is now highly
signiﬁcant: an unexpected 5% fall in the S&P500 Index induces an interest rate cut of about
19 basis points. The asset price response to movements in the policy rate is large, though the
point estimate is far less accurate relative to Regime 1. The second row of Figure 3 is the mirror
image of the ﬁrst row as the distribution of the monetary policy parameter is concentrated in
the positive orthant while the distribution of the asset price coeﬃcient is far more dispersed.
Interestingly, using daily observations over the 1990s, a diﬀerent identiﬁcation strategy
and, most importantly, a linear model with a time-varying covariance matrix, Rigobon and
Sack (2003) ﬁnd that on a monthly basis the Fed moves the interest rate downward by 14
points in response to an asset price change of 5%. It is worth noting that Rigobon and Sack’s
estimate falls in between our estimate of the monetary policy response during normal times, 6
basis points, and our estimate of the Fed reaction in the high asset price volatility regime, 19
basis points. Turning to the asset price response to monetary policy, Rigobon and Sack (2004)
report that an interest rate increase of 50 basis points implies a 3:4% decline in the S&P500
Index whereas Bernanke and Kuttner (2004) ﬁnd a value of 2:6%. Our estimates imply a value
of 2:3% and 4:7% for the low volatility regime and the high volatility regime respectively.
5Unlike the response on inﬂation and output gap, there is apparently less consensus in the empirical literature
about whether monetary policy may respond to asset prices contemporaneously, as speciﬁed in Rigobon and
Sack (2003), or with some lags, as speciﬁed in Bernanke and Gertler (1999). Table 3 reports the sum of the
interest rate responses to contemporaneous and lagged asset price return. It is worth noticing however that the
only signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in the reaction of the Fed to the stock market is the second lag of asset price return
in the high volatility regime.
94 An alternative identiﬁcation: System GMM
This section uses GMM and shows that the results obtained with the TSVAR model are robust
to the identiﬁcation and the method of estimation. The GMM estimates are based on a two-
equation system made up of an interest rate reaction function and a stock market equation.
An advantage of the bivariate system is that we do not need to specify explicitly a process for
inﬂation and output gap, which leads to a more parsimonious model of the following form:
it = ®1Et¡1 (¼t) + ®2xt + ®3qt¡1 + ½it¡1 + "i
t (8)
qt = ®4xt + ®5it + "
q
t
The ﬁrst equation is a conventional Taylor-type rule augmented with a ﬁnancial market
indicator.6 The second equation relates asset price returns to contemporaneous movements
in output gap and interest rate and can be interpreted as the reduced form of the structural
equation that relates asset prices to the stream of future expected discounted dividends. Our
empirical speciﬁcation follows the one employed by Bernanke and Gertler (1999).
Prior to estimation we replace expected values with actual values. The disturbance term is
then a linear combination of forecast errors and therefore is orthogonal to any variable in the
information set available at time t ¡ 1. The list of instruments includes six lags of inﬂation,
output gap, the fed funds rate, the ﬁrst diﬀerence of asset price and its volatility.
To address the issue of monetary policy regime switches we conduct two experiments. In the
ﬁrst, we estimate recursively the two-equation-system (8) using the observations corresponding
to times in which the threshold variable is not below a given moving cut-oﬀ value. We start
from a value of 0:012 for the asset price volatility and we then expand the subsample by moving
the threshold down by 0:001 step. In the second experiment, we go in the opposite direction
and we consider only the observations associated to times in which asset volatility is below the
moving cut-oﬀ value. We start from a value of 0:008 for the asset price volatility and we then
expand the subsample by moving the threshold up by the same steps as before.
As the process of the federal funds rate has a near-unit root, an unrestricted version of
the system (8) produces very imprecise estimates. To ﬁx the problem, we restrict ½ = 1 and
for consistency we specify the stock market equation in ﬁrst diﬀerences. The restricted model
produces far more accurate and stable estimates. Figure 4 depicts the monetary policy response
to movements in the asset prices under the two experiments. The estimate associated with the
observations not below the value of 0:012 for the asset price volatility is signiﬁcant and equal
to 0:02. As the sub-sample expands because of a lower threshold value, the point estimate
6Results are robust to using a forward-looking speciﬁcation with the nominal interest rate responding to the
forecast of inﬂation twelve-months ahead.
10declines and the conﬁdence band becomes larger. In the limit, which virtually corresponds to
the full sample at the very right-end side of the panel, the monetary policy response to asset
price is estimated as low as 0:008 and the conﬁdence interval virtually includes zero. Panel
B is the mirror-image of Panel A in that the point estimate increases with the value of the
threshold. The Fed response to the stock market is however not statistically diﬀerent from
zero in most sub-sample and in the limit case is equal to 0:008.
A similar patter emerges from Figure 5, which displays the reaction of asset price returns
to monetary policy news. The ﬁrst experiment in Panel A shows that lower values of the
threshold are actually associated with lower and less accurate point estimates. The stock
market response to movements in the interest rate is signiﬁcant and just below the value ¡6
using the observations not below the threshold value of 0:012. As soon as the sample size
increases however, the point estimate gets larger and more accurate up to a value of ¡2:9.
More importantly, the conﬁdence band shrinks when the included observations approach the
full sample, thereby conﬁrming the result of the SVAR that the data points in the low volatility
regimes are helpful to identify this parameter. In analogy with the result in Figure 4, Panel
B is the mirror image of Panel A also in Figure 5 as the stock market response declines with
an increase in the threshold value. The point estimate is never statistically diﬀerent from zero
and in the limit it converges to a coeﬃcient of ¡2:9.
Despite the diﬀerence in the method of estimation, the results using a recursive system
GMM bear out the ﬁndings from the Nonlinear SVAR model. Speciﬁcally, the monetary policy
response to movements in the stock market is larger during periods of high volatility than
during periods of low volatility of asset price returns. Moreover, the Fed reaction is statistically
diﬀerent from zero only in the high volatility regime. Some point estimates, especially those
on the interest rate reaction function, are somewhat sensitive to the change in the method of
estimation. The size of these diﬀerences appear however neither quantitatively important nor
unreasonable given the sampling uncertainty.
Several authors have estimated the monetary policy response to movements in the stock
market over some post-1979 samples using single equation GMM. Bernanke and Gertler (1999)
augment an otherwise conventional Taylor rule with the lag of asset price returns and they
do ﬁnd that the Fed does not react to the stock market. Chadha, Sarno and Valente (2004)
report a set of statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients that range from 0:011 to 0:037 depending
on the speciﬁcation of the interest rate reaction function and the measure of asset price, with
their favorite estimate being 0:015. The presence of nonlinearities documented in this paper
and neglected in earlier contributions appear a reasonable candidate to reconcile the diﬀerent
estimates obtained using some linear model of the monetary policy reaction function.
115 Conclusions
Modelling and identifying the interaction between monetary policy and the stock market is
complicated by two factors. The ﬁrst is a standard endogeneity problem according to which
the Central Bank may react to movements in asset price returns while asset price returns are
sensitive to the interest rate set by the monetary authorities. The second is the existence
of nonlinearities such that the magnitude of these reactions possibly depend on the state of
the ﬁnancial market. This paper develops an empirical nonlinear model and two alternative
identiﬁcation strategies to confront these issues.
Using US monthly data over the last two decades, we ﬁnd that during periods of high
volatility in asset price returns: an unanticipated 5% fall of the stock market index implies
a statistically signiﬁcant interest rate cut of 19 basis points; a monetary policy tightening
of 50 basis points translates into a 4:7% decline of the S&P500, though this response is not
statistically diﬀerent from zero. In contrast, during normal times: the Fed signiﬁcantly reacts
to inﬂation and output gap only, and it does not respond to asset price returns. Speciﬁcally,
an unexpected interest rate rise of 50 basis points induces a signiﬁcant fall in the stock market
index of about 2:3%. GMM estimates of a two-equation system made up of an interest rate
reaction function for the Central Bank and an asset price equation for the market yield a
similar picture.
Our results therefore suggest that the nexus between monetary policy and asset price is
better described as nonlinear because of speciﬁc, historically limited episodes. This ﬁnding
limits the beneﬁts of using single equation linear Taylor rules as a description of US monetary
policy over long periods characterized by diﬀerent and variable ﬁnancial market conditions. In
particular, at crucial times like the stock market crash of 1987, the crises of 1997-98, and the
burst of the high-tech bubble at the end of the 1990’s, the Fed appears to respond also to asset
price return in an eﬀort to mitigate the negative eﬀects of the bust on economic activity. We
provide narrative evidence that also supports the notion of a reactive monetary policy stance.
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13Appendix: the Data
The data used in the empirical part are as follows:
FFR: Eﬀective Federal Funds Rate
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System H.15
CPI: Consumer Price Index For All Urban Consumers: All Items (SA) Index 1982-84=100
Source: BLS
S&P 500 Composite Stock Price Index
Source: Daily Press
Industrial Production Index (SA) Units: Index 1997=100
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System G.17
The yearly inﬂation rate, ¼t, is the year-to-year growth rate of the CPI index.
The output gap, xt is the HP cycle computed from the Industrial Production Index.
The growth rate of the S&P 500 Index is computed by taking the within-month average of
daily observations on the S&P 500 Index and then computing the growth rate.
The threshold variable, zt, is the within-month standard deviation of the daily growth rates
of the S&P 500 Index.
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Figure 1: The Regimes and the Threshold Variable 
 
 
Figure 2: The Series and the Monetary Policy Regimes   16
Figure 3: Distributions of Selected Structural Parameters 
   
 
Notes: Monthly data. Sample: 1985:8 – 2003:10. The policy instrument is the federal funds 
rate and asset price returns are measured as the first (log) difference of the Standard and 
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Figure 4: GMM Rolling Estimates of the Monetary Policy Response to Asset Prices 
 
Panel A: Estimates based on the observations associated with a value of the asset 




Panel B: Estimates based on the observations associated with a value of the asset 
price volatility BELOW the threshold displayed on the X-axis 
 
Notes: Monthly data. Sample: 1985:8 – 2003:10. Standard errors are computed 
using a four lag Newey-West covariance matrix estimates. See previous Tables 
for variable construction. The instrument set includes six lags of inflation, output 
gap, the fed funds rate, the first difference of asset price and its volatility.   18
Figure 5: GMM Rolling Estimates of the Asset Price Response to Interest Rate 
   
Panel A: Estimates based on the observations associated with a value of the asset 




Panel B: Estimates based on the observations associated with a value of the asset 
price volatility BELOW the threshold displayed on the X-axis 
 
Notes: Monthly data. Sample: 1985:8 – 2003:10. Standard errors are computed 
using a four lag Newey-West covariance matrix estimates. See previous figures 
for variable construction. The instrument set includes six lags of inflation, output 
gap, the fed funds rate, the first difference of asset price and its volatility.   19
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 














Federal funds rate  5.3799 5.6071 4.9549 
Asset price return  0.8479 1.8043 -0.9406 
Output gap  -0.0694 -0.1246 0.0338 
Inflation  3.0038 3.0478 2.9215 
Variance of asset 
price return  0.0094 0.0068 0.0142 


















Federal funds rate  2.1089 2.0531 2.1592 
Asset price return  3.5638 2.5040 4.4714 
Output gap  1.0893 0.9753 1.2760 
Inflation  1.0947 0.9841 1.2791 
Variance of asset 
price return  0.0053 0.0017 0.0062 
     
 
Notes: Monthly data. Full sample: 1985:8 – 2003:10. Inflation is measured as the change in 
the consumer price index and the output gap is the HP cycle of the Industrial Production 
index. The policy instrument is the federal funds rate and asset price returns are measured 
as the first (log) difference of the Standard and Poor’s 500 stock market index. The 
volatility of asset prices is the within-month standard deviation of the first difference of the 
S&P’s 500. 
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  Federal 
funds rate 
Asset price 
return  Output gap  Inflation  Variance of asset 
price return 
          
Federal funds rate  1 0.084  0.375  0.618 -0.059 
Asset price return   1  -0.148  -0.047  -0.455 
Output gap    1  0.324  0.096 
Inflation       1  -0.046 
Variance of asset 
price return        1 
 
Regime 1 – low asset price volatility 
 
  Federal 
funds rate 
Asset price 
return  Output gap  Inflation  Variance of asset 
price return 
          
Federal funds rate  1 0.109  0.337  0.584 0.135 
Asset price return   1  -0.138  -0.172  0.157 
Output gap    1  0.359  -0.186 
Inflation       1  -0.081 
Variance of asset 
price return        1 
 
Regime 2 – high asset price volatility 
 
  Federal 
funds rate 
Asset price 
return  Output gap  Inflation  Variance of asset 
price return 
          
Federal funds rate  1 -0.042  0.468  0.672  0.030 
Asset price return   1  -0.130  0.007  -0.453 
Output gap    1  0.295  0.178 
Inflation       1  0.014 
Variance of asset 
price return        1 
          
 
Notes: Monthly data. Full sample: 1985:8 – 2003:10. Inflation is measured as the change in the 
consumer price index and the output gap is HP cycle of the Industrial Production index. The 
policy instrument is the federal funds rate and asset price returns are measured as the first (log) 
difference of the Standard and Poor’s 500 stock market index. The volatility of asset prices is the 
within-month standard deviation of the first difference of the S&P’s 500.   21







Low asset price Volatility 
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High asset price volatility
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  0.037*** 
 
 












Notes: Monthly data. Sample: 1985:8 – 2003:10. Inflation is measured as the change in the 
consumer price index and the output gap is the HP cycle of the Industrial Production index. The 
policy instrument is the federal funds rate and the asset price return is measured as the first (log) 
difference of the Standard and Poor’s 500 stock market index. The volatility of asset price changes 
is the within-month standard deviation of the first difference of the S&P’s 500. The third and the 
fourth rows refer to the contemporaneous reactions of monetary policy to inflation and output gap 
whereas the entry for asset price return refers to the cumulative reaction. The last row reports the 
contemporaneous response of asset price return to the interest rate. The point estimates are the 
median of 10000 bootstrap repetitions. The superscript ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the 
one-side null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 15 percent 
significance levels, respectively. 
 